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Abstract

Africa’s Sahel suffers from multidimensional challenges that require robust solutions to
address the issues. The regional crisis is aggravated by multiple factors that include climate risks,
poverty, unemployment, water shortages, weak governance, lack of rule of law, food security to
cite a few. Thus, a combination of factors greatly contribute to the Sahel crisis, resulting in severe
security threats. This study attempts to analyze the role of the G5 Sahel states and the international
community in counter-terrorism efforts. However, the region has emerged as the new battleground
for terrorism along with a growing threat of violent extremism and other organized crime. In
response to the threat, regional leaders and the international community are working together to
address the threat of terrorist activities in the area. This effort involves the Group of Five (G5)
Sahel states (Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Chad). France, the U.S. and the United
Nations have contributed, directly or indirectly, in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel region.
The UN Security Council established the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy/Office and passed
relevant resolutions to prevent and counter terrorism. The question now is: have all the national
and global counterterrorism strategies to combat terrorism in the Sahel been effective?
My hypothesis is that the use of force is necessary but not enough in addressing this threat. I
argue that counterterrorism in the Sahel will fail unless the root causes of local recruitment are
assessed and properly addressed. Rampant poverty and poor governance make vulnerable people
easy targets for terrorist groups. Long-term peace, stability and security can only be achievable
once the population is provided sustainable development and good governance. Indeed, the region
is vulnerable due to the precarious conditions of the people on the ground, weak governance as
well as the lack of rule of law that contribute to the vulnerability or motivation of the people in the
Sahel to likely join extremist and Islamist movements.
This research employs a descriptive and analytical approach, relying on previous scholarly
and expert sources to describe the role and challenges that face different actors involved in the
counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel region before discussing about the root causes of the
vulnerability of populations to recruitment by extremist armed groups in the Sahel. In doing so,
this study uses violent extremism, extremism and terrorism interchangeably as a code name for
Jihadists.
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Chapter I
Introduction
The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force and
violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population,
or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”1 This present day,
terrorism has become one of the major and troublesome issues of our times. Since the terror attacks
of 9/11 in the United States, terrorism has become a global menace, threatening international peace
and security. In response to this danger, member states of the United Nations (UN) established a
global strategic and operational approach to coordinate and enhance national, regional and
international counter-terrorism efforts. The goal of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy is
to resolve and strengthen global action necessary to combat and prevent the evolving threat of
terrorism and violent extremism2.
The African continent has emerged as the new battleground for al-Qaeda and the Islamist State
(ISIS) in Iraq and Syria. North Africa, particularly, suffers from massive terror attacks escalated
by the tremendous wave of migrating ISIS fighters while al-Qaeda recruits and adherents expand
their influence in other states such as Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Niger.3 The upsurge of ISIS has
significantly influenced Boko Haram, a Sunni Islamic sect in Nigeria, to pledge allegiance to the
leader of the Iraq/Syria-based Islamist State. The group launched deadly attacks and abductions in
Nigeria and the borders areas of Chad, Niger and Cameroon4. As a result, the Multinational Joint

1

2
3
4

US Federal Code of Regulations (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85).
Hanny Megally, “The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review,” Center on International Cooperation, 2017.
Jacob Wirtschafter, Karim John Gadiaga, “Africa is the New Terrorist Battleground for ISIS and al-Qaeda, USA Today, 2017.
Congressional Research Service, 2018.
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Task Force MNJTF was launched in 2012 by four countries that include Cameroon, Niger, Chad
and Nigeria to fight against the Boko Haram uprising in the Lake Chad basin.5
However, after the fall of Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya became a destination
for many fighters due to the availability of weapons and to provide possible support to ISIS. In
addition, the Arab Spring along with the "ungoverned spaces” throughout the Maghreb and the
lack of substantive border control enabled the rise of transnational connections between extremist
groups like Ansaroul Islam, the Macina Liberation Front, Boko Haram, the Algerian Salafist
group, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Mourabitoun, the Movement for Unity and
Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). The above extremist groups like the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) are classified and designated by the U.S as Jihadist militant groups and foreign
terrorist organization, operating in the Sahara and Sahel.6 The Sahel region became home to these
violent extremist groups, witnessing critical security threats with a growth of radical and
internationally connected movements who use violence to instill fear across the region.7
The Sahel region, which is made up of ten countries with a population close to 135 million
inhabitants, encounters serious security threats along with other challenges that includes poverty,
hunger, health and environment issues, poor education, corruption, weak governance as well as
water scarcity. Truly, all these factors have greatly contributed to the worsening security situation,
which could consequently fuel conflict and violent extremism in the region. The Sahel is emerging
as an area of rising extremism infested with violent terrorist groups and jihadists moving from Iraq

5

The International Crisis Group, “Finding the Right Role for the G5 Sahel Joint Force,” Africa Report No 258, 2017.
Zachary Lamb; Jonathan Masters, “Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb,” Council on Foreign relations, 2019.
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and Syria. As a result, countries like Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have undergone deadly terror
attacks, killing many civilians and soldiers.
Hence, regional leaders worry and express deep concern about instability and the growing
insecurity throughout the Sahel. In response to this increasing security threat, five Sahel nations
that include Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Chad with the support of the international
community formed a new joint task force responsible for combating and preventing the spread of
terrorism across the region through collaboration and sharing of resources, so as to facilitate a
better response to the security threat as well as development challenges within the Sahel zone8.
Terrorism remains a problematic and worrying issue. It is essential to understand the causes
and consequences in order to be aware of and respond to this global phenomenon. As stated above,
a common definition of terrorism is the unlawful use of violence to intimidate civilians in order to
instill fear which is motivated by an ideological, religious or political purpose. People around the
world fear terrorism and the multiple terror attacks in different countries. No country is immune,
meaning that no one is safe from the escalation of terrorist and violent extremist groups.
It is also important to identify the consequences and negative impacts that result from terrorist
attacks. Terror attacks can engender massive civilian casualties and material damage that include
loss of life for many people, the destruction of public property and other significant social effects.
Moreover, terrorism-related acts can bring about other medical consequences such as causing loss
of limbs and other disabilities, trauma, mental stress and sexual violence.

8

Jennifer G. Cooke, , “Understanding the G5 Sahel Joint Force: Fighting Terror, Building Regional Security?,” Center For
Strategic and International Studies 2015
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In addition, terrorist attacks have negative effects on the economy by reducing production,
investment, loss of tourism, market uncertainty and badly shaking the continuity of the businesses.
Moreover, terrorism creates xenophobia, which can cultivate hatred among people or communities
based on ethnic, religious or social differences.9 Primarily, terrorism poses a direct threat to the
security of citizens. Therefore, it is important to understand the problems related to terrorism and
identify some of its causes and effects. Also, raising public awareness and alerting people to
terrorist-related crimes is valuable.
Since its creation, the G5 Joint Task Force has several ongoing operations in the border
areas of Mali and Mauritania, the region between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger as well as the
Niger/Chad border area. The G5 Sahel Joint Counterterrorism Force is composed of 5,000 troops
backed by 4,000 French troops, working with regional militaries. The Joint Force has received
millions in financial support from regional and international donors to become fully operational
and strengthen the capabilities of the G5 Sahel Joint force.10 Nevertheless, the G5 countries lack
the necessary resources and competence to weaken terrorist groups in the Sahel zone. Funding
becomes an issue, but logistics, intelligence and other challenges add up to the difficulties and
constraints, which constitute obstacles to achieving successful operations.11
Despite the fact that the G5 effort is significant, the Joint Task Force is seriously underfunded
and under-resourced. Even if there were to be greater funding along with equipment and
intelligence-related resources, the effort is not getting at the root causes that need to be properly

9

Muhammad Safeer Awan, “Global Terror and the Rise of Xenophobia/Islamophobia: An Analysis of American Cultural
Production since September 11,” Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, Islamic Studies, Vol 49, pp. 521537, 2010.
10 Jennifer G. Cooke, “Understanding the g5 Sahel joint Force: Fighting Terror, Building Regional Security,” The Center for
Strategic and International Studies.
11 “Finding the Right Role for the G5 Sahel Joint Force,” The International Crisis Group, 2017.
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addressed. The G5 along with the UN and others need to find the best solution to resolve tensions
and local conflicts in order to prevent recruitment and to promote and integrate inclusion as well
as opportunities for the youth. Through effective regional cooperation, Sahelian countries must
improve access to education and the creation of employment for young people and women in order
to promote and sustain peace and security in the region. Therefore, the answer to the terrorist
question in the Sahel is two-fold. In the short term, the G5 must use force to defeat the terrorist
groups, but in the long term, these countries will have to address the underlying social issues and
economic conditions in order to diminish the appeal of terrorist organizations.
My hypothesis is that the use of force is necessary but not enough in addressing this threat.
The G5 Sahel group mandate will not sufficiently address the problem because of their lack of
understanding or taking into consideration the root causes which include these three issues: (1) the
vulnerability of the locals for recruitment, (2) the poor system of governance within Sahelian
countries, and (3) the lack of rule of law throughout the region.
This thesis research focuses on important issues and urgent challenges to achieve peace and
stability in the Sahel region. I will analyze the work of the G5 and examine the root causes of
different local conflicts within the G5 countries in the region. Then, I will discuss the poor system
of governance in these countries. Third, I will talk about the limited opportunities of the
populations in Africa’s Sahel region.
Methodologically, this research employs a descriptive and analytical approach relying mainly
on secondary research sources and information, including data analysis. For the purpose of this
study, this research particularly acquires information from articles, online databases of journals,
books, interviews and reports issued by the United Nations. My study will rely on previous
scholarly and expert sources already written to analyze and describe the root causes of conflicts
9

and extremist armed groups in the Sahel. This thesis intends to show the basic elements that
contribute to the vulnerability or motivation of the people in the Sahel to likely join extremist and
Islamist movements.
After a brief description, argument and methodology in chapter one, this thesis is structured as
follows. The second chapter provides the literature review that summarizes previous research done
by scholars and analysts regarding this topic. The third chapter offers an analysis of the terrorism
problem in the Sahel. Then chapter four will discuss the creation of the G5 and its efforts that
include (a) the coordination, (b) minimal resources, (c) French efforts and (d) U.S. involvement.
Chapter 5 elaborates on (1) the conditions of the people on the ground, (2) the vulnerability of
local people, (3) weak governance throughout the region and (4) the lack of the rule of law. Chapter
6 specifies the role and actions of the United Nations regarding the Sahel crisis. The last chapter
will conclude and provide some policy recommendations.
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Chapter II
Review of the Literature
Major research has been conducted on global efforts to combat terrorism. Experts from the
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) assessed and reported on the strengths and weaknesses of the
international counterterrorism regime over the past decade. The report states that the international
community develops instruments and other strategic initiatives to better deal with the threat of
terrorists. According to the experts, the counterterrorism regime lacks effective and coherent
central coordination to better respond and prevent the global threat of terrorism. Further, the article
argues that the UN Security Council passed numerous counterterrorism resolutions after the US
9/11 terrorist attacks. However, only a few member states implement UNSC resolutions or
demonstrate attention in the fight against terrorism. The report talks about the important progress
and the significant weaknesses that confront the global counterterrorism regime12.
In 2013, John Harbeson, a political scientist, asserted that the war on terrorism on the
African continent started a decade before the 9/11 terror attack. The assault occurred in Sudan in
the nineties and then in Nairobi at the U.S embassies. After these attacks, the U.S. focus on
terrorism in Africa became noticeable with the deployment of more troops on the continent. John
Harbeson argued that Africa is not exempt from terrorism due to its weak states, poverty,
“ungoverned space,” ethnic and religious diversity, political instability, which constitute eminent
factors to the growth of radical movements connected to terrorism. In addition, the article explains

12

“The Global Regime for Terrorism,” The Council on foreign Relations, 2011
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how Africa’s Sahel has become the new battleground and how terrorism has become serious
problem in the region.13
In 2017, the UN Security Council welcomed and supported the deployment of the Joint
Force of the G5 Sahel: Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Chad and Niger. The Council passed the
Resolution 2359 (2017)14 and recognized the group of five states for the Sahel to address, set up
and ensure the protection of civilians and to combat the threat of terrorism. The UNSC also urged
the G5 Sahel states, the MINUSMA and French forces to ensure effective coordination, exchange
of information and to continue efforts towards sustainable and effective operationalization.
The author, Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde, questions the G5 force’s capabilities to achieve
magic in Africa’s Sahel region. She addresses the challenges faced by the Joint Force to include
the lack of financial and logistical support from the United Nations and its members. In the article,
Signe Marie relates the troop and financial support deployed by the European Union, but also the
cut in peacekeeping expenditures by the Trump administration. According to her, the U.S hesitated
for many reasons to authorize the G5 Joint Force, the financing for a new mission by the Security
Council seems to be an excuse for resisting formal approval. In the article, the author insisted on
the need of the regional as well as international forces to address and respond to the security
concerns of local people in order to move forward toward peace and stability in the Sahel.15
Virginia Comolli, a Research Fellow at The International Institute for Strategic Studies
(IISS) in London, explains, in her article, “Counterterrorism yearbook 2019: West Africa and the
Sahel,” why instability in the Sahel will likely continue and how the dynamics of the conflicts may
13

John W. Harbeson, “The War on Terrorism in Africa,” in Africa in World Politics, 6th ed., Westview Press, 2011.

14

UN Resolution 2359 (2017) Security Council
Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde, “Can the G5 Force Work Counterterrorism Magic in Africa’s Sahel Region?” The

15

WORLDVIEWS, Pass Blue, 2017
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shift over the coming months. This conflict analysis describes how the region is made up of two
epicenters of instability such as the Western Sahel including Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, which
are home to multiple affiliates of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The second axis in the Lake
Chad Basin comprises Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon, which are fighting against Nigerian
Boko Haram today aligned with ISIS. The author reveals the multiple missions and foreign
presence, each with its own priorities, which contribute to the coordination challenges.
Additionally, Virginia Comolli argues how the international (Western) effort has taken up a focus
on counterterrorism by implementing the Algiers Peace Accord in Mali, a crucial security and
political solution to the conflict. Furthermore, the article reminds us that complacency is
dangerous, but expecting significant improvement in short terms is impractical because the road
to sustainable stability across the region remains tricky.16
An article by Lori-Anne Theroux and Baba Dakono, published by the Institute for Security
Studies (ISS), blames the escalation of violence in the Sahel region on intra-and inter-communal
tensions, which is exploited by violent extremist groups. The article states that these tensions are
often attributed to ethnic differences across the region. As a result, the extremist groups take
advantage of these tensions and divisions to recruit and convince local communities to join their
jihadi groups.17
In 2017, the United Nations Security Council Unanimously Adopted Resolution 2359, which
reveals that the UNSC welcomed the deployment of the group of five (G5) Joint Force of the five
Sahel states that would address the threat of terrorism and transnational organized crime in the

16

Virginia Comolli, “Counterterrorism yearbook 2019: West Africa and the Sahel,” The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2019.
17
Lori-Anne Theroux-Benoni and Baba Dakono, “Are terrorist groups stoking local conflicts in the Sahel?” The
Institute for Security Studies, 2019.
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region. The Council also accepted the Joint Force’s strategic concept of operations and intended
to review the deployment in four months' time. In addition, the press release reports that the
Council urged the Joint Force to have up to 5,000 military and police personnel, as well as the
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and
French forces in the region to ensure adequate coordination and exchange of information regarding
their operation.18
Robert Muggah, a Canadian political scientist, and Jose Luengo Cabrera, West African
researcher specialist, argue that Africa’s Sahel region is undergoing bloody inter-communal
violence between farmers and herders, killing thousands of civilians from Burkina Faso, Mali,
Niger, Mauritania, Chad and Nigeria. According to both authors, climate change is partly
responsible for conflicts. To be more specific, more than 50 million people in the Sahel depend on
livestock to survive. Unfortunately, droughts and floods are more frequent, which jeopardize food
production. As a consequence, Jihadist groups take great advantage of the unwelcome climate
conditions and violence. In the article, Robert and Jose Luengo clearly assert that West Africa
Sahel suffers from escalated climate risks, food insecurity as well as communal violence. In
addition, the region’s violent conflicts are spreading from one country to another, since national
borders are open and insecure. They insist that Jihadists are taking over the region despite multiple
foreign-supported counterterrorism operations which fail to contain the growing violent activities.
In sum, they infer that climate change and organized violence will likely deepen in the next coming
years.19

18

UN Resolution 2359 (2017) security Council
Robert Muggah and Jose Luengo Cabrera, “The Sahel is engulfed by violence. Climate change, food insecurity and extremists
are largely to blame,” The World Forum, Igarape Institute, 2019.
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Christina Murphy, a program associate for the Fund for Peace, describes how the Sahel
region has become home to growing regional and international peacekeeping and counterterrorism
operations. She follows by highlighting the many challenges that face Sahelian states and their
capacity to effectively respond to these threats. According to Christina, it is important to prevent
the spread of violent extremism, but the Sahel also faces other threats that expose and endanger
current and future stability in the region. In the article, Christina indicates that undoubtedly Mali
is ranked as the worst country in 2017 (FST) Fragile States Index.20
Further, she explains the conflict greatly impacts the Malian population and state security. Since
the start of the conflict in 2012, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
recorded hundred thousands of Malian refugees in 2017.21 The Boko Haram insurgency in
Northern Nigeria added to the massive displacement in the Lake Chad basin, in Niger, Chad and
Cameroon. The cross-border attacks by Boko Haram also contribute to an increasing number of
refugees in Chad, Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso, which place more pressure on these
countries to meet their own populations’ needs.22
Then, she emphasizes the Sahel’s vulnerability to global climate change, its negative impact on
livelihoods and food insecurity in the region. In fact, Christina points out that the Sahel goes
through a veritable storm of social, economic as well as security challenges. However, to ensure
future stability in the region, it will require more than only a military approach. In other words, to
reduce the pressure on the countries in the Sahel, it is wiser to invest in education along with
infrastructure, to address poverty, youth engagement, governance initiatives and family planning.

20

Christina Murphy, “Stability in the Sahel Region Will Require More Than Just Counter-Terrorism,” The Fund for Peace, 2018
United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees Government”-UNHCR/Mali situation
22
Christina Murphy, “Stability in the Sahel Region Will Require More Than Just Counter-Terrorism,” The Fund for Peace, 2018.
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Governments in the region and their partners must get to the broader causes of violent extremism
and insecurity in order to achieve a peaceful and stable future for the Sahel.23
Chapter 3 of the book “Democratization in Africa: African Views, African Voices,”24 talks
about democratization and governance in Africa. The National Research Council identifies the
major reasons for poor governance and “bad” politics in most African countries. Political scientists
in the Namibia workshop indicate that good governance requires efficient as well as effective
cooperation between a state and its citizens. Participants in the World Bank workshop in Namibia
emphasized that the concentration of power in the hands of the elites, the failure of the state to
protect human rights, and the increasing problem of corruption contribute to poor governance and
politics in African countries. In addition, it was pointed out that democracy, legitimacy,
accountability, transparency and justice have been significantly impeded, which results in
considerable disappointment. Participants noted that the economic crisis and human conditions
cannot be resolved unless Africa’s people participate and contribute to the structures and political
context of the socioeconomic development for a brighter future. Another challenge for Africa to
achieve good governance is to develop transparency, equal opportunity and end corruption. This
latter poses a profound threat to all systems of government. Corruption is considered as a way of
life in many African countries and it constitutes a general problem for governments of developing
countries anywhere in the world.25
Chester A. Crocker, a former U.S. ambassador, outlines in a journal article published by the
Hoover Institution Press that conflict and governance are somehow linked in Africa. Crocker
implies that the nature of governance depends on the legitimacy of the exercise of authority. And

23
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a legitimate authority requires accepted laws and norms as well as unconstrained power of the
rulers. In Africa for example, Crocker points out that Africa’s conflict difficulty derives from
different forms of violence, which sometimes gain support from criminal and traffickers' networks.
In addition, religious militants along with local grievance activists make connections with terrorist
groups. Crocker reveals that African nations with complex ethnic and geographic features are
subjected to multi-sourced violence.26
The former U.S. ambassador mentions that the severity of the security challenges is accentuated
by the collapse of Libya after 2011, the spreading of arms across the Sahel and the climate
conditions placing pressure on farmer and herder relationships. Moreover, the dangerous
proliferation of local ISIS and al-Qaeda in the Sahel is provoked by the ungoverned spaces in most
areas of the region. As noted, Crocker observes the link between conflict and governance. For
Crocker, African states need strong and responsive institutions since weak and fragile states do not
lead to good governance. African political leaders should strengthen policies and laws that
determine relations between farmers, herders, other neighbor identity groups, criminal networks,
public officials, the lands and ordinary citizens. According to him, ethnic conflict is more often
generated by bad governance and political entrepreneurs. Expressly, poor leadership can lead to
weak capabilities to govern the local communities. Otherwise, countries with bad governance are
menaced by corruption and other governance consequences.27

26

Chester A. Crocker, “African Governance: Challenges and Their Implications,” Paper prepared for Governance and the
Emerging World Project, The Hoover Institution, 2018.
27 Chester A. Crocker, “African Governance: Challenges and Their Implications,” Paper prepared for Governance and the
Emerging World Project, The Hoover Institution, 2018.
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Chapter III
Description of the situation
Africa’s Sahel is a vast region, which is made up of ten countries with 135 million inhabitants.
This semi-arid region extends from the Sahara to the North and the Sudanese Savanna to the South,
which covers the south of Mauritania, northern east of Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, south of
Algeria, Niger, northern Nigeria, Chad and northern Ethiopia. However, countries in the Sahel
suffer from poverty, food insecurity, poor governance, environmental degradation, political
instability, inequality, insecurity and economic difficulties, to cite only several challenges. A
number of these multiple factors greatly contributes to the vulnerability of its populations, which
encourage them to join extremist and Jihadist groups. The extremist groups take advantage of the
ethnic and economic conditions to influence local communities and drive recruitment mostly in
countries like Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.28
As the terrorist networks increase, the Sahel faces serious security threats and experiences
deadly terrorist attacks in countries like Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger where hundreds of civilians
and soldiers are killed. Unfortunately, the diffusion of the threat becomes contagious and
neighboring countries are not immune from terrorism within their borders. The extremist groups
in the Sahel include Ansaroul Islam, the Macina Liberation Front, Boko Haram, the Algerian
Salafist group, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Mourabitoun, the Movement for
Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) all take advantage of the region’s ethnic and economic
grievances to drive new recruitment among local communities. These different groups are linked

28

Flore Berger, “Jihadist violence and communal divisions fuel worsening conflict in Mali and wider Sahel,” The International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2019.
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to Al-Qaeda or IS (Islamist State) and join forces by creating a larger and better coordinated
organization. 29
As stated, the Sahel faces widespread violence and the number of terrorist attacks has
increased in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, killing more civilians and soldiers. However, Islamist
groups including MUJAO, AQIM, and Ansar al-Dine thrive and gain strength over “ungoverned
spaces” across the Sahel region. Militant Islamist groups control the northern territory of Mali and
threaten the security of populations in neighboring countries. Most of their activities involve
attacks on civilians, ambushes on military troops, bombings of popular markets, hotels, cities and
restaurants across the region. The people struggle of extraordinary levels from forced displacement
due to terrorist attacks. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) observes thousands
of people fleeing across the region causing large scale population displacements.30
Africa’s Sahel region has emerged as the new battleground in the fight against terrorist
groups.31 In response to this growing threat posed by these militant Islamist groups, the G5 Sahel
Joint Force was formed in 2017 to combat terrorism and trafficking threat across the region. The
G5 Sahel states, which comprise Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Chad and Niger, were created
so that the region’s leaders could take care of their own security by coordinating their efforts. The
Joint Force has been endorsed by the African Union (AU) and strengthened by resolution 2359
(2017) of the United Nations Security Council, which urges the G5 Sahel to coordinate its efforts
with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) in Mali

29

Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, Baba Dakono, “Are terror groups stoking local conflicts in the Sahel? The Daily Maverick, Institute
for Security Studies, 201.9
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and French forces in order to combat terrorism and prevent its spreading throughout the
continent.32
Besides all the efforts and the presence of foreign troops in the region, Jihadist groups
thrive and continue to pose a potential threat to Sahelian countries. African countries decided to
take on the responsibility for their own security and engage in a “war on terror” to the extent of
managing regional stability across the Sahel zone. Yet, can the G5 Joint Force alongside foreign
forces present in the region defeat terrorists and organized crime in Africa’s Sahel region? The
G5 Sahel Joint Force presents an opportunity to improve security cooperation among countries in
the Sahel.33 It also represents a good chance to enhance border control to better respond to the
growing insecurity in the region. However, West African forces lack adequate resources, which
include limited training, equipment, intelligence, financial and logistical support, and a
commitment from the international community to counter asymmetrical threats. In response, the
G5 Sahel Joint Force was created to combine a joint task force to better respond to the security
and development challenges of the Sahel region. By doing so, the region’s leaders aim to take care
of their own security.
Still, Africa’s Sahel region faces development and security challenges that include poverty,
food security, health issues, and lack of education problems with access to safe water, weak
governance, corruption, human rights abuses, black markets and other organized crimes. In fact,
the spread of violent extremism or terrorism in the region has largely contributed to a worsening
security situation and increased conflict in the Sahel zone.34 Most extremist network groups are
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linked to al-Qaeda or the Islamist State (IS), which join forces to create a well-coordinated
organization. Overall, terrorist and extremist groups exploit the political emptiness, weak
governance, the vulnerability of the locals and the freedom of movement across borders to initiate
potential recruits and training opportunities.35
To sum up, the Sahel remains vulnerable and it demands robust regional and international
responses to address the different challenges and the immediate security threat posed by violent
extremism and terrorist groups. So far, the military efforts undertaken by the G5, French and the
United Nations, in short, are perceived as inadequate since the Sahel continues to deteriorate, and
the terrorist and extremist groups expand ambitions and capabilities. Therefore, addressing the root
causes that contribute to the problem could have greater utility in containing the growing violent
extremism, terrorism and security threats in the region.
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Chapter IV
The Creation of the G5 Sahel

22

In 2014, the regional leaders from Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mauritania met in
Nouakchott to form a regional body, the G5 Sahel in order to enhance regional partner’s
coordination through defense, strategies, security as well as policies within the Sahel. Three years
later, the G5 officially launched its Joint Force and received support from the African Union and
the UN Security Council, which unanimously adopted a resolution that authorized UN
peacekeepers deployed in Mali to provide the Joint Force with logistical and operational support.36
The G5 Sahel Joint Force seeks to improve security among countries who share borders along the
Sahel by deploying joint patrols to block the flow of terrorists. The Joint Military Force, under the
command of General Didier Dacko from Mali, is comprised of 5,000 soldiers.37 The G5 presidency
rotates and Niger currently holds the Presidency. However, its military headquarters is based in
Mali. The Sahel Joint Force has an estimated budget of euro 450 million to cover operations and
equipment resources. Unfortunately, even with the contribution of members, who each pledges
euro 10 million along with contributions by international partners, there is still a budget deficit.
While the G5 Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S) remains a crucial joint force established to address
instability in the Sahel region, the group still deals with several challenges related to its
coordination and availability of resources.
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a) The Coordination
The Joint Force of the G5 Sahel with the support of French counterterrorism forces conducted
several military operations including operations “HAWBI” in 2017; and “PAGNALI” in 2018,
and other ongoing operations in border zones between countries within the Sahel.38 However, the
Sahel (FC-G5S) still lacks effective coordination among member states as well as with other
external forces present in the region. For instance, FC-G5S’s collaboration with MINUSMA
remains problematic due to conflicting mandates/priorities. The UN mission’s mandate was to
only help stabilize and support Mali’s political process, and not necessarily engage in stemming
the flow of terrorists into the Sahel region. But, has MINUSMA succeeded in restoring stability in
Mali? For now, it is still an ongoing process.
UN Assistant-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Hassim Wane stated in a
briefing that FC-G5S’s success greatly depends on effective coordination and a deeper regional
partnership to make up a strong and operational military force.39
In addition, the Sahel region has welcomed several different forces, yet no effective plan or
military operation has yet alleviated or weakened the spread of terrorism and Jihadist groups in
the region. A coordinated response among forces is necessary in order to promote an effective
operationalization, contain terrorism, and disband terrorist networks operating in the region. This
zone continues to be highly threatened by ISIS, al-Qaeda and other militant groups. The French
forces have been criticized over failing to fully cooperate with the G5 force.40 Consequently, the
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creation of the FC-G5S force would be useless without security collaboration and information
sharing from regional forces, to include French forces, the United Nations forces and other external
forces. Some analysts and officials warn about the future of the FC-G5S, dealing with minimal
resources and lacking international support.
b) Minimal Resources
For a fully operational force, FC-G5S requires sustainable resources and funding in order to
fight terrorism and any other criminal networks in the Sahel region.41 To be more specific, the FCG5S lacks reliable financial support to be completely functional. Regional as well as the
international community must be sufficiently generous and provide funds more than were initially
requested to guarantee long-term funding to the FC-G5S. So far, each country in the Sahel pledged
about 10 million euros plus other donors that had together pledged 2 billion euros in support of the
FC-G5S. However, Niger’s President Issoufou has alleged that only 18 million euros of a total of
414 million euros pledged had been received, compromising its ability to organize and deploy its
soldiers across the Sahel region.
In addition, FC-G5S struggles with other challenges that include training, communications
technology, lack of availability of heavy equipment, and camp protection. Indeed, the FC-G5S
needs support and sufficient training to prevent terrorists from spreading across the entire African
continent. However, as stated by Burkina Faso Foreign affair Minister, Alpha Barry, the FC-G5S
is in the phase of building strength and dealing with functional difficulties, while terrorists have
mastered the fabrication and use of explosive devices.
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42

Nowadays, terrorists are equipped with

high technologies and utilize popular technologies to communicate, recruit and to achieve
successful operation. Therefore, the FC-G5S would require sophisticated sensors and surveillance
equipment to monitor and constrain Jihadist groups’ position and movements.
c) French Efforts
As Former French colonies, Africa’s Sahel countries deal with major developmental
challenges, a growing threat of terrorism as well as other organized crime. Since the beginning of
the crisis in the region, France has been committed to support the Sahel states in their efforts to
deter and fight against the threat of terrorism across the Sahel area.43 Hence, France remains a key
player in the counterterrorism mission in Mali and the Sahel alongside FC-G5S.
In 2012, Mali’s national integrity and security was severely threatened by terrorist and radical
movements. According to the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, France, under the
request of the Malian government, started in 2013 operation “Serval” that aimed to expel and
diminish the advance of Islamic militants in Mali. After liberating Mali’s northern cities, French
military forces stayed in the Sahel region. The battle against extremist/terrorist groups is far from
the finish line. As a consequence, armed groups along with the Islamist State in the Greater Sahara
conducted sophisticated attacks across Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso borders.44. In response to the
concerning insecurity in the Sahel, the French government launched in 2014 operation
“BARKHANE” against Islamist groups in Africa’s Sahel region . This ongoing counterterrorism
operation consists of 5,100 French troops along with the armies of the region to guarantee longterm security from Mali to Chad.
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Since its involvement in the Sahel crisis, French soldiers have eliminated more than 600
Islamist militants during different military operations. However, French forces have also suffered
significant casualties to include soldiers engaged in combat with Islamist militants. Despite
ongoing French efforts, the region continues to struggle with violent attacks against civilians and
security forces. Consequently, the number of Jihadist attacks have intensified, killing 71 soldiers
on a Niger military base. Moreover, the rise of anti-French sentiment has grown among the local
population and intellectuals, especially in Mali. After years of failed military efforts, citizens began
to grow suspicious of France’s intentions, as the former colonial ruler. At a January 2020 summit
held in France, and in response to the growing suspicious, the French President Emmanuel Macron
urged the G5 Sahel leaders, at the summit on the situation in the Sahel region to address whether
they still needed French partnership in the fight against Islamist militant.45After the conference,
also attended by the UN Secretary-General, France and the G5 Sahel leaders decided to reinforce
their efforts and coordination in the fight against the rising threat of Islamist fundamentalism.
d) U.S. Involvement
The United States has been slowly expanding its military presence throughout the continent
of Africa. After the 9/11 terror attack, the U.S. began to focus more on terrorism in Africa by
deploying a contingent of American troops. Prior to this particular deployment, the U.S. military
had already deployed a contingent of 1000 civilians from the Department of Defense to train and
conduct exercises with local forces.46 In the aftermath of France’s intervention in Mali to free the
northern part of Mali seized by Jihadists, the U.S. established a base and provided training and
logistical assistance to local armies that included peacekeeping and counterterrorism missions in
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Mali. However, the presence of the U.S. military involvement in the Sahel region was unpopular
until the 2017 deadly ambush of four U.S. army soldiers in Niger.
Preceding that incident, the American military had a light footprint across the region,
counting on European and African partners to carry out most counterterrorism missions across the
region. The United States maintains continuous efforts alongside Western and African
governments to eradicate the extremist groups. To be specific, the U.S. Africa Command
(AFRICOM) along with its partners, works to counter threats and strengthen security forces and
address crises in order to promote U.S. national interests and regional security as well as stability.
General Wald Hauser, the head of U.S. Africa Command informed the AFRICOM support team
in providing training and equipment to the Nigerien armed forces and assisting the Trans-Sahara
Counter Terrorism Partnership. The Pentagon claimed that 800 U.S. troops are present on Nigerien
soil but do not have a direct combat mission. They are training Nigerien forces to defend and
conduct counterterrorism raids. The ambush in Niger killing some U.S. soldiers has brought
attention to U.S. involvement, raising many questions about its real mission in the region. General
Wald Hauser declared later that the soldiers were playing a back-up role for Nigerien forces on
counterterrorism missions but did not get involved in direct combat.47
In 2018, the Pentagon announced plans to reduce the number of U.S. forces conducting
counterterrorism operations in Africa.48 In addition to the decision to pull out of Africa, the U.S.
planned to discontinue military support for French forces fighting against Islamist militants or ISIS
al-Qaeda-linked groups. Unfortunately, the measure comes as the region’s security situation is
getting worse with escalated deadly attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. On one side,
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American withdrawal would weaken and undermine its European allies. On the other, the G5
leaders characterized a U.S. retreat as a risk that could trigger future terrorist attacks in the Sahel
region. Some critics alleged that the U.S. interests in Africa’s Sahel are peripheral, driving its
minimal involvement in the region.
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Chapter V
Condition of the People on the Ground
Africa’s Sahel is dealing with many development challenges and serious security threats across
the region. So far, the approach has been focused on security and mostly military engagement to
fight and prevent the spread of violent extremism. However, it will require more than a military
response to ensure and maintain future stability. It will require addressing the root causes of the
security crisis within the Sahel region.49
Africa’s Sahel lies to the South of the Sahara desert, which exposes the region to harsh climatic
conditions. The Sahel region is extremely vulnerable to climate change by experiencing high
temperatures, poor rainfalls, frequent droughts, failed crops, and soil or land degradation.
Explicitly, countries like Mauritania, Chad, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso are all dealing with
environmental issues that involve periodic droughts, deforestation, soil erosion as well as dry and
semiarid climate conditions.50 The continued degradation of soil and water scarcity have negative
consequences on agricultural production, livestock and food security throughout the region .As a
result, these conditions threaten the lives of millions of people and jeopardize the supply of
animals. To be specific, the region greatly depends on agriculture and livestock for survival and
the climate constraints impact significantly farmers as well as pastoralists, contributing to food
insecurity. In countries like Burkina Faso and Chad, agriculture remains the main labor source as
it makes up 79% of Niger’s economy.51.
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In addition, water shortages constitute another challenge that raise major health concerns,
including poor hygiene conditions, diseases, epidemics, lack of access to safe water and
malnutrition.52 Hence, water scarcity in rural areas contribute to mass displacement in order to find
drinking water, to cultivate or provide for the livestock. Consequently a number of factors such as
chronic poverty, climate risks, failed crops, lack of pasturages gave rise to tensions and violence
across the region.53 Also, food insecurity becomes a severe threat thousands of people from Mali
and its neighboring countries, which all struggle with food deficits. According to the United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, millions of people in the Sahel are food insecure,
suffering from severe food insecurity.54 The ongoing food crisis and regional instability have led
to mass displacements, fleeing the conflicts.
1- Vulnerability of the people
Countries of the Sahel are more vulnerable to the threat of violent extremism because of some
“push factors” that include ethnic conflict, unemployment, and lack of resources for the youth.
Historically, the region has experienced civil wars and armed conflicts, specifically in Libya, in
Burkina Faso and in Mali. The above countries share common challenges that increase the risk of
violent extremism in the region. However, the security situation was deteriorated within the region
due to rising ethnic violence among Tuaregs (nomadic pastoralists) and other religious tensions or
conflict inter community between the Fulani and Mossi ethnic groups.55 As a result, many villagers
were killed in northern Mali. Later, ethnic violence and conflict spread across neighboring

52

Robert Muggah and Jose Luengo Cabrera, “The Sahel is engulfed by violence: Climate change, food insecurity and extremists
are largely to blame,” The World economic Forum, 2019
53 Robert Muggah and Jose Luengo Cabrera, “The Sahel is engulfed by violence: Climate change, food insecurity and extremists
are largely to blame,” The World economic Forum, 2019.
54 https://www.care.org/emergencies/sahel-hunger-crisis
55 Augustin Loada and Peter Romaniuk, “Preventing Violent Extremism in Burkina Faso: Toward National Resilience amid Regional
Insecurity,” Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2014.

31

countries where thousands of civilians from Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad Niger, Mauritania and
Nigeria were killed over land degradation, water shortages, and livelihoods’ crisis between farmers
and pastoralists. Therefore, most of the factors that include displaced people alongside climate
change, violent groups and the prevalence of weapons triggered intra-intercommunal tensions and
later regional conflict.56 Unfortunately, Jihadists from al-Qaeda and ISIS have been taking
advantage by exploiting rivalry and tensions between ethnic groups to conduct recruitment or fuel
violence by encouraging inter-ethnic conflicts. Under these circumstances, people fled and left
their homes affected by the conflict and displaced within their own countries or became refugees
in other countries.57 Vulnerable civilians can be likely or unlikely targeted or exposed to
recruitment into extremist groups.
Furthermore, the Sahel is experiencing a rapid population growth and has one of the youngest
demographics in Africa. However, its population is expected to double in the next twenty years,
meaning that the number of people in the G5 countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and
Niger) could greatly be extended in the next years.58 This phenomenon could add to major factors
that challenge future generations in terms of providing education and jobs for these additional
youth. Beside demographic challenges, most countries in the Sahel are affected by a high
unemployment rate and poor literacy. The unemployment rate in Chad is 2.60 in 2020, Burkina
Faso turned around 6.40% in 2019, Mali around 7.9% in 2017, Niger 2.60% in 2016, and
Mauritania 11.70% in 2016.59 According to the World Bank data for 2016, Unemployment is
higher for youth and women in all five Sahel countries where female unemployment rates are
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higher and many are seeking for employment but unable to find jobs.60 Youth unemployment is
rising, leaving young people with limited opportunities, no sources of income and lack financial
resources and marginalized. Insecurity associated with unemployment triggers participation in
insurgencies or rebellions, which can influence people to join violent extremism or Jihadist groups.
Also, the literacy rate of the different countries within the region remain very low. To be clear,
The percentage of people who know how to read and write was 19.1% in Niger in 2015, Mali
35.5% in 2018, Burkina Faso 41.2% in 2018, Chad 22.3% in 2016, , and Mauritania with the
highest literacy rate reached 53.5% in 2017. Still, there are more females who are illiterate than
males within the five countries in the Sahel. As a pivotal skill, literacy represents a key measure
of a population’s level of education.61 Overall, women and young people in the Sahel region have
become more vulnerable to terrorist recruitment due to unemployment, poor literacy/education,
social and political marginalization, which all constitute factors that support recruitment into
violent extremist or terrorist groups.62 Hence, the G5 Sahel states must create economic
opportunities, improve young people’s access to education, develop training and facilitate youth
employment in order to inspire them to stand up for their communities and combat economic
driven migration and of course violent extremism.63 African governments, particularly the G5
states have to examine the development challenges and socioeconomic factors that attract recruits
or drive people to commit terrorist acts. To tackle and prevent violent extremism, the G5 states
along with their international partners must address poor education, lack of employment
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opportunities, promote youth involvement and economic development in order to improve
populations’ living to achieve the combat against violent extremism in the region.
2-Weak Governance throughout the Region
There is no doubt that most Sahel states have failed to address the root causes of vulnerability to
Islamic groups that mostly involve economic and political fragility which makes the region
susceptible to longstanding crises and conflicts. Indeed, this issue is exacerbated by the limited
government presence and a plethora of many “ungoverned spaces” in the Sahel and North Africa.
This resulted in the flow of dangerous weapons and well-armed fighters into the Sahel.64 To be
more specific, the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali along with weak governance and corruption
led to inefficient counterterrorism and facilitated extremist groups to seize control of Northern
Mali. In response to the situation in northern Mali, its neighboring countries intensified efforts to
block violent extremists and other criminal networks.
In fact, several states that have practiced bad governance are making signs of progress.
However, they need to improve governance by implementing democratic institutions, promoting
popular participation for local communities and ethnic groups, boosting transparency, ensuring
accountability, and combating corruption. This latter issue constitutes a real threat to all systems
of government. If truth be told, corruption is a general problem for developed and developing
countries. However in most African countries the problem of corruption is viewed as a way of
life.65 Despite, anti-corruption and commitment efforts from the leaders in Africa, countries still
ranked or had a high score on the 2019 corruption perceptions index. A country score indicates its
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perceived level of public sector corruption on a rating scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (Highly
clean) in the world. The corruption perception index recorded a score of 29/100 for Mali, a score
of 40/100 for Burkina Faso, a score 32/100 for Niger, a score of 20/100 for Chad and a score of
28/100 for Mauritania.
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The problems of corruption in African states are caused by weak

institutions, bad governance, and lack of transparency as well as accountability, conflict and weak
justice. These several factors likely increase corruption, which can impede a country’s economic
and development growth.
Moreover, the nature and quality of governance shape and determine the level of peace and
stability in every country.67 Historically, many African states dealt with multi-sourced conflicts or
violence. Recently, Africa’s Sahel region endured complications that involved the collapse of
Libya in 2011, the gradual desertification, inter-communal tensions or ethnic conflicts, the
spreading of arms and violent extremism, and the proliferation of local al-Qaeda and ISIS in the
region.68. The countries of the Sahel face tough choices to address and respond to the region’s
security challenges, opening the door to susceptible risks of corruption. Poor or bad governance
cultivate more likely instability. Therefore, the countries of the Sahel should improve governance
and strengthen their institutions in order to better respond to the chronic security, political and
development challenges in the region.
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3-The lack of rule of law
A combination of factors has been ranked among the root causes that contributed to the Sahel’s
regional security crisis. These factors include but are not limited to poor governance, corruption,
weak security institutions, discrimination, human rights abuses and lack of rule of law.69 Most
states in the Sahel are unable or do not have the capacity to control illicit drugs, illegal arms, human
trafficking across their borders, fueling violence and instability in the region. The lack of rule of
law within the Sahel region is confounded by the customary judicial system which suffers from
corruption and politicization. As a result, it undermines the legitimacy, authority and trust in state
courts. To be more specific, it was reported by the U.S. embassy in Bamako, Mali, that its judicial
system was highly corrupt, accepting dirty money as a manner to influence the outcome of a case.
It has been observed that the judicial system of most countries in the Sahel are not independent
along with the inappropriate behaviors of some government’s officials, which use public office for
private gain.70
Furthermore, the culture of impunity has led to human rights abuses in the region. In Burkina
Faso, the security forces conducted many executions and mass detentions. According to a Human
Rights Watch (HRW) report, the majority of the security force abuses were ethnic Fulani. These
types of human rights violations or ethnic discrimination could result in mass frustrations.
Consequently, as the report stated, this abuse encouraged most members of the Fulani community
in the region to join extremist groups. The impunity of crimes that include human rights violations,
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rape, summary executions and torture negatively impact on the lives of civilians or local
communities.71
The growing tensions and insecurity in the region is accentuated by corruption, impunity and
the lack of rule of law and justice. Otherwise, the absence or ineffective response to crime and
conflict that involve cattle theft, banditry, illegal detention, attacks on public places as well as
other injustices committed by state agents worsen state legitimacy. Worst case scenario, it could
raise violent extremism or breed ground for jihadist and organized crime groups.72 In sum, it is
critical to empower the rule of law and reform the justice system. In addition, implementing
potential reform frameworks would lead to protecting human rights, the respect of law, and
strengthening governance. In addition, a successful response to the Sahel crisis requires the Sahel
regional governments to address widespread issues that contribute to tensions or conflicts. A strong
rule of law demands an independent justice system, fair and transparent prosecution and ensures
respect for human rights. Most importantly, the alleged perpetrators must be held accountable for
the crimes committed in order to stop violence and restore peace in the region.
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Chapter VI
The Role and Actions of the UN Regarding the Sahel Crisis
According to the UN, terrorism refers to “criminal acts directed against a state and intended
or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons.” 73
Terrorism has become a global catastrophe to international peace and security. Specifically,
terrorist organizations constitute a serious threat to peace, security and stability in the Sahel region.
However, the United Nations strongly condemns the activities of terrorist organizations that
includes MUJAO, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al Mourabitoune, Ansar Eddine,
and associated groups such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, Ansaroul Islam and Islamic
State in Greater Sahara and their affiliates such as the Front de Liberation du Macina (FLM), which
continue to operate in Mali and constitute a threat to peace and security in the region and beyond.74
Once a French colony and a cultural hub of West Africa, Mali was overrun in January 2012
by a coalition of Tuareg and terrorist groups moving south towards the capital Bamako. After
unsuccessful joint efforts by the African leaders of the Sahel region and France to resolve the
conflict, the UN Security Council (UNSC) authorized the UN to deploy in July 2013 the
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in order to help stabilize
Mali and assist the country’s return to constitutional order.75 MINUSMA was established by the
UNSC resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013 to support the political process and help stabilize Mali.
The Mission would operate under robust rules of engagement with a mandate to use all necessary
means to address threats to the implementation of its mandate, which would include protection of
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civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, protection of United Nations personnel from
residual threats, cooperation with the Malian defense and security forces.76 In addition, the mission
eases the political reconciliation process, monitors the implementation of ceasefire agreements,
assists in the integration of displaced persons, delivers humanitarian assistance and works
alongside Malian authorities to protect and promote human rights.77
In response to this global threat, all Member States of the United Nations agreed on a global
strategy in 2006 to coordinate their counter-terrorism efforts. To be clear, UN Member States
adopted by consensus the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. This strategic approach intends to
enhance national, regional and international efforts to counter terrorism. In addition to sending a
clear message that terrorism is unacceptable in all its forms and manifestations, the Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy was mandated Member States to take individually and collectively
significant steps to prevent and combat terrorism.78
As a result, UNSC welcomed the decision of the States of the Sahel and Sahara to set up the
FC-G5S on 19 December 2014. Under resolution 2359 (2017), the UNSC encouraged the G5 Sahel
to address the impact of terrorism, transnational organized crime, and endorse the deployment of
the FC-G5S throughout the territories of its contributing countries, with up to 5,000 military and
police personnel, with a view to restoring peace and security in the Sahel region.79
It also welcomed the efforts of the French forces to support these operations and urged
MINUSMA, the French forces along with the FC-G5S to ensure adequate coordination and
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exchange of information, through relevant mechanisms, of their operations. Nonetheless, the
UNSC Resolution recalled that the G5 Sahel States have the responsibility to provide the FC-G5S
with adequate resources and urged the G5 Sahel States to continue efforts towards the sustainable,
viable and effective operationalization of the FC-G5S.80 Later, on June 2017, the UN General
Assembly established through the resolution 71/291 the creation of the UN Office of CounterTerrorism (UNOCT) to assist Member States in implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism
Strategy. Overall, the UN has classified the Sahel region as a top priority for peacebuilding efforts.
The goal of the UN Support Plan for the Sahel is to foster human security, resilience to shocks and
threats in the Sahel by strengthening local, national and regional authorities, and actors' capacities
to enhance governance, ensure social service delivery and basic rights, restore and improve
security, stability and resilience in cross- border regions.81
Despite regional and international response efforts, terrorism continues to pose a serious
security threat across Africa’s Sahel region. Experts warned about terrorist groups emerging
strength regardless of special operations led by France, the U.S. and the UN. Unanimously, the
UN adopted resolution 2462 (2019) under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter that calls
upon UN Member States to combat and criminalize the financing of terrorists and their activities,
reaffirms principles contained in UNSCR 1373 (2001) — adopted in the wake of the 11 September
2001 attacks in the United States. It also demands all Members States to ensure that their counterterrorism measures are in compliance with their obligations under international law.82
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Unfortunately, the security situation in the Sahel region of Africa is deteriorating with rising
terror attacks claimed by Islamist militants against civilians and military targets have particularly
in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The Special Representative and Head of the United Nations
Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), Mohamed Ibn Chambas, stated during the
biannual presentation the Secretary-General’s latest report on the UNOWAS Office, that the region
has experienced a “devastating” surge in terrorist attacks against military and civilian targets, with
alarming humanitarian consequences.83 According to the head of UNOWAS, protecting civilians
in the region requires a fully integrated response led by the concerned governments.84 In the
subsequent debate, the UNSC expressed deep concerns about the spread of terrorism, organized
crime, intensified intercommunal violence in Burkina Faso and central Mali, and humanitarian
conditions in the region. Council members roundly condemned attacks against civilians, security
and defenses forces, as well as peacekeepers, stressing that intercommunal and sectarian violence
is jeopardizing regional growth, and requires development-focused political and security
approaches to tackle poverty, unemployment and other underlying causes of instability.85
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Chapter VII
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
Africa’s Sahel region faces multiple and evolving political, economic, security and
humanitarian challenges. The Sahel remains vulnerable due to unpredictable weather patterns,
severe droughts, reduced rainfalls and land degradation that threaten the livelihoods of highly
vulnerable communities. Consequently, climate-related shocks contribute to persistent food
insecurity across the region. In addition, the Sahel has a significant population close to 135 million
inhabitants which continue to grow beyond the region’s capacity. Truly, Africa’s Sahel confronts
major challenges that include but are not limited to poverty, hunger, health and environment issues,
malnutrition, poor education, unemployment, corruption, weak governance as well as water
scarcity, lack of rule of law and serious security threats. The combination of these factors has
greatly contributed to the worsening security situation, which could consequently feed conflict and
violent extremism in the region. In fact, historical intra- and intercommunal tensions between
pastoralists, semi-pastoralists, and sedentary populations involving armed violence is worsened by
militant Islamist groups.86
Thus, the extremist groups take advantage of the ethnic rivalries, economic conditions and the
vulnerability of the Sahel countries to influence local communities and perform recruitment among
vulnerable populations in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso and so on.87 Undoubtedly, militant
Islamist groups trigger social conflict and exploit intercommunal violence in order to establish
their own governance space and present themselves as social regulators capable of providing
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security in the region.88 However, the prevailing insecurity has exposed the Sahel countries, which
were already struggling with structural fragility due to their weak states. Indeed, the Sahel states
have failed to address the root causes that mostly involve economic and political fragility which
makes the region more susceptible to longstanding crises and conflicts.89 Hence, this security
situation is also aggravated by the limited government presence and a plethora of many
“ungoverned spaces” in the Sahel and North Africa. As the terrorist networks increase, the Sahel
continues to struggle with severe security threats and experience deadly terrorist attacks. Sadly,
the diffusion of the threat has become contagious and threatened the Sahel and their neighboring
countries.
To respond to these security concerns, regional leaders raised concern over the deteriorating
security situation across the Sahel region. Therefore, they set up the G5 Sahel joint force (FCG5S), a joint project undertaken by the five countries of the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger and Chad) to stabilize the region. The force was welcomed and backed by the UNSC, which
urged the FC-G5S, the French forces along with MINUSMA to enhance cooperation, ensure
adequate coordination and exchange information in order to achieve effective operationalization.
According to the UNSC resolution 2359 (2017), the G5 Sahel States have the responsibility to
provide the FC-G5S with adequate resources. The FC-G5S for the Sahel accomplished significant
steps and major efforts in countering terrorism and other organized crime across the region.
However, their counter-terrorism efforts have been insufficient and ineffective. So far, the efforts
of the FC-G5S to counter the activities of terrorist groups and other organized criminal groups
remain unsuccessful due to many problems that involve inadequate coordination and lack of
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availability of resources. The FC-G5S lack of appropriate resources along with weak coordination
between the different forces present in the region led to ineffective operationalization. Following
my hypothesis, the use of force is necessary but not enough in addressing this threat, meaning that
taking into consideration and addressing the root causes of the Sahel crisis. In other words, military
as well as humanitarian efforts will fail unless there are better actions on climate risks, sustained
development, improved governance and the conditions of the people on the ground. Countries of
the Sahel possess limited capacities to respond to extremist/terrorist threat and deal with the
multiple and complex challenges alone. Therefore, it would require strong national leadership
together with effective international support to better address and tackle the regional crisis. In
addition, the international community along with regional leaders need to provide the FC-G5S
with sufficient funds and adequate resources necessary to defeat terrorist organizations. Most
importantly, Africa’s Sahel needs national governments along with the UN and the Western
powers to find greater solutions to poverty, demographic pressures, governance failures and
environmental worries intensified by climate change. So, addressing development, security
challenges and root causes must be the primary resolution in response to the Sahel crisis. These
challenges urgently need to be resolved to avoid or weaken the capacity of militant Islamist groups
to recruit vulnerable populations.
It is also necessary to examine the number of factors that affect or shape the behavior of
marginalized people who are confronted with violent extremism. Clearly, social marginalization
constitutes a critical factor that could influence people’s decision to join violent extremist or
terrorist groups.90 The Sahel crisis will definitely need more than a military solution. It should
include peacebuilding initiatives, outreach and inclusion of local communities, and better efforts

90

Kaley Fulton and Benjamin P. Nickels, “Africa’s Pastoralists: A New Battleground for Terrorism, 2017

44

to engage dialogue with militant leaders across the region. An investment in peace and stability
will be required to maintain stability in Mali and its neighboring countries because instability is
contagious. It is in the interest of the global community to unanimously address the Sahel security
crisis since it threatens international peace and security. Terrorism has become a phenomenon that
necessitates universal cooperation to combat this serious threat.
Policy Recommendations
These are some proposals that would have a significant impact on the Sahel crisis:
•

Creating long-term solutions needed to address climate, social, economic, environmental
as well as political conditions to tackle the challenges faced by the Sahel vulnerable
populations

•

Building human capital by investing in education and health (promoting equal access)

•

Raising the age of marriage to allow the girls and young women to go to school and
participate in their countries’ development

•

Establishing framework policies that help create better skilled jobs for the youth

•

Creating more jobs in order to create earnings and to boost economic growth

•

Promoting good governance that ensures equity, transparency, development benefits that
will improve quality of life

•

Extending social services to rural families

•

Strengthening rule of law and institutions

•

Building up citizens’ trust in justice
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•

Ending abuses and growing impunity for parties responsible for violence against civilians,
killing or other crimes that involve pro-government groups or security forces, jihadist
groups, bandits, and militias

•

Deepening intercommunal dialogue and engaging in more peacebuilding efforts to avoid
intra-intercommunal conflicts and prevent further worsening security situation

•

Committing to fight corruption to free Africa from corruption

•

Including women/youth in political participation in the Sahel region

•

Ensuring willingness to address the violence

•

Promoting Human Rights by protecting people any against abuses

These policy proposals are complex and require significant resources, but countering terrorism
will not be fully effective without addressing the needs of the people of the Sahel.
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